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Mary T. Noonan 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: State v. Sampson, Case No, 890327-CA 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
This letter is to provide supplemental authority, 
pursuant to rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, for 
the State's position on an issue which was raised by the Court in 
the oral argument in the above-entitled case. The issue was 
whether a second set of Miranda warnings could serve to clarify 
an equivocal reference to counsel under State v. Griffin, 754 
P.2d 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The Delaware Supreme Court 
answered this question in the affirmative in Crawford v. State, 
580 A.2d 571 (Del.Supr. 1990); a copy of that case is attached. 
Thank you for your assistance in this matter. 
Sincerely, 
v4r ' £ w i-iz^ 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
CB/pa 
cc Richard G. Uday 
CRAWFORD v. STATE Del. 571 
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Family Court for a de novo hearing, on the 3. Criminal Law <$=»412.2(4) 
merits, before a different Judge. In order for defendant to rely upon 
Miranda's bar against further police ques-
fw\ tioning, it must be shown that request for 
• ^ > ^ ^ counsel has been effectively conveyed to 
interrogating officers. U.S.C.A. Const 
Amend. 5. 
( O | KEY NUMBER SYSTElO 
Steven D. CRAWFORD, Defendant 
Below, Appellant, 
v. 
STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff 
Below, Appellee. 
Supreme Court of Delaware. 
Submitted: June 19, 1990. 
Decided: Sept. 21, 1990. 
Defendant was convicted of murder in 
first degree, first-degree arson and posses-
sion of deadly weapon during commission 
of felony in the Superior Court, New Castle 
County, and defendant appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Walsh, J., held that defen-
dant's attempted invocation of his right to 
counsel was ambiguous and did not bar 
further questioning following police at-
tempts at clarification. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <®=>412.2(4) 
Where suspect has made explicit re-
quest for assistance of counsel, no further 
questioning by police may occur until coun-
sel is provided or suspect himself initiates 
further conversation. U.S.C.A. Const 
Amend. 5. 
2. Criminal Law 0=412.2(4) 
In determining whether statements 
made by suspect to police are admissible, 
court must determine whether suspect ac-
tually invoked his right to counsel prior to 
making statements, and if so, statements 
by suspect are admissible only if suspect 
initiated further discussion and suspect 
knowingly and intelligently waived right to 
have attorney present U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 5. 
4. Criminal Law <3=>412.2(4) 
Defendant did not unequivocally re-
quest assistance of counsel but rather am-
biguously invoked his right prior to ques-
tioning by police; although defendant indi-
cated that he was looking for attorney, he 
did not indicate that he would deal with 
police only through counsel, and further 
testified at suppression hearing that he in-
tended to deal directly with police in effort 
to persuade them that he was not involved 
in crime under investigation. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 5. 
5. Criminal Law <®=>412.2(4) 
Per se rule requiring complete cessa-
tion of questioning of defendant by police 
upon equivocal request for counsel places 
burden of perceptual clarity entirely on po-
lice. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 5. 
6. Criminal Law <3=>412.2(4) 
Threshold standard used to determine 
whether statements made by defendant to 
police after ambiguously invoking right to 
counsel looks to totality of circumstances 
surrounding ambiguous invocation in 
search for intent with heavy burden of 
clarity upon * defendant. U.S.C.A. Const 
Amend. 5. 
7. Criminal Law <s=>412.2(4) 
When utilizing clarification approach in 
determining whether statements made by 
defendant to police after ambiguously in-
voking right to counsel are admissible, in-
terrogating officer must limit questions to 
those designed to elicit definitive indica-
tions of intent when suspect makes such 
request for counsel. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 5. 
8. Criminal Law <3=»412.2(4) 
When defendant has ambiguously in-
voked right to counsel prior to questioning 
by police, police should utilize clarification 
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approach to attempt to determine suspect's 
intention; if clarifying questions or re-
peated Miranda warnings indicate that 
suspect does not wish assistance of coun-
sel, interrogation may continue. U.S.C.A. 
Const Amend. 5. 
9. Criminal Law $»U2.2<4) 
Police acted in good faith m use of 
repeated Miranda warnings in effort to 
clarify defendant's intentions to invoke 
right to counsel prior to questioning and 
thus, statements made following warnings 
were admissible in murder trial; while de-
fendant's precustodial conduct suggested 
that he wanted to confer with attorney, at 
no time while in police custody did he as-
sert desire to consult with counsel before 
questioning, even though he was aware 
that his sister was continuing search for 
attorney, U.S.C.A, Const.Amend. 5. 
10, Criminal Law ^414 
Suppression hearing testimony may be 
used to determine defendant's subjective 
intention to invoke right to counsel at time 
of interrogation. U.S.C.A. Const Amend. 
5. 
Appeal from Superior Court AF 
FIRMED. 
John R. Hiner, Jr. (argued) and Edward 
C. Pankowski, Jr., Asst. Public Defenders, 
Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, 
for appellant, 
Gary A. Myers (argued), Deputy Ally. 
Gen., Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, for ap-
pellee. 
Before MOORE, WALSH and 
HOIJ^ND, JJ 
WAIJSH, Justice; 
This is an appeal by the defendant, Ste-
phen D. Crawford ("Crawford"), from a 
conviction in the Superior Court of murder 
in the first degree, as well as related 
charges of first degree arson and posses-
sion of a deadly weapon during the com-
mission of a felony. Crawford contends 
that the trial court erred in refusing to 
suppress a statement made by him while in 
police custody after he had invoked his 
right to counsel, We conclude that Craw-
ford's attempted invocation of his right to 
counsel was, at best, ambiguous and did 
not bar further questioning following po-
lice attempts at clarification. Finding no 
error in the Superior Court ruling, we af-
firm the convictions. 
I 
The farts pertinent to the defendant's 
allc)ralions of error are essentially undis-
puted On Saturday, January 30, 1988, 
Marcella Stewart was found murdered iu 
her apartment. She had suffered numer-
ous injuries from a beating and stabbing, 
The bed in which her body lay had been sel 
on fire, presumably in an attempt to con-
ceal her murder. Crawford, a former boj 
friend of the victim, was a suspect m the 
ensuing investigation. The police made 
several attempts to locate Crawford in or 
der to question him. During the period 
from Saturday through Monday, the police 
visited various locations and left business 
cards with requests that the defendant con 
tact them 
On Tuesday, February 2, 1988, Crawford 
telephoned the police and spoke with one of 
the investigator, Officer Vietri. Vietri 
tit-Led the defendant to come to the police 
station for questioning In the course of 
the conversation, there was some mention 
of an attorney. According to Officer Viet-
ri, the defendant asked whether he should 
bring an attorney. Officer Vietri respond-
ed that the defendant would have to decide 
that for himself. However, the defendant 
testified that he indicated to the officer 
that he was planning to contact an attorney 
before presenting himself at the police sto 
tion. 
After his telephone call to the poliuj, 
Crawford attempted to locate an attorney 
With the aid of relatives, he visited one law 
office and telephoned another, Unable to 
retain counsel, the defendant proceeded to 
the office of a third attorney who had 
previously represented his sister. While en 
route, the defendant was taken into custo-
dy by police officers, including Vietri, who 
had secured a search warrant authorizing 
them to secure handprints, hair samples 
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and fingernail scrapings from the defen-
dant 
Officer Vietri advised the defendant of 
his Miranda rights and asked if he was 
willing to talk to the police. The defendant 
answered that he understood his rights and 
that he would be willing to talk. In re-
sponse to Officer Vietri's subsequent ques-
tion concerning his destination, the defen-
dant responded, "I was looking for a law-
yer." The defendant's concern about locat-
ing counsel was not relayed by Vietri to the 
other officers responsible for confinement 
or questioning. 
Officer Vietri then turned the defendant 
over to other officers, who transported the 
defendant to the police station. While en 
route, the defendant initiated a conversa-
tion with one of the transporting officers, 
Officer Glose. Glose interrupted the de-
fendant and read the Miranda rights a 
second time. The transporting officers did 
not interrogate the defendant, nor did they 
attempt to pursue the conversation initi-
ated by the defendant. 
Upon arrival at the police station, the 
defendant was handed over to the detec-
tives responsible for the investigation. De-
tective Tabor, who was unaware that the 
defendant had been attempting to find a 
lawyer when apprehended, advised the de-
fendant of his rights a third time. The 
defendant expressly agreed to talk to the 
officers without a lawyer present.1 Tabor 
and another officer then interviewed the 
defendant orally. When an attorney con-
tacted by Crawford's sister arrived at the 
police station and directed that the inter-
view stop, the police ceased further ques-
tioning. 
Although under detention for a body 
search, the defendant was not placed under 
arrest. Furthermore, he was aware that 
when the body search was completed he 
would be released. The statements made 
by the defendant during interrogation were 
1. At the suppression hearing, the defendant's 
testimony indicated that he intended to talk to 
the police with or without counsel. Aware that 
his sister was continuing the search for an attor-
ney, the defendant testified that he decided, 
nevertheless, to answer police questions. 
generally exculpatory, consisting of expla-
nations of his whereabouts at the time of 
the murder. Through further investiga-
tion, the police were able to demonstrate 
certain contradictions and inaccuracies in 
the defendant's statements. This evidence 
was presented at trial as proof of the de-
fendant's guilt 
II 
Crawford contends that his active search 
for an attorney constituted an unequivocal 
invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to 
counsel, and police questioning with knowl-
edge of his effort contravened that right. 
Alternatively, he argues that even if his 
actions are deemed an ambiguous invoca-
tion, the failure of the police to clarify his 
intentions renders subsequent statements 
equally suppressible under Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 
L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). To the contrary, the 
State argues that the police proceeded 
properly in the face of Crawford's ambigu-
ous conduct. 
In Miranda, the Supreme Court extend-
ed the Fifth Amendment right to silence to 
include a right to counsel during interroga-
tion. Id. 86 S.Ct. at 1630. Determining 
that custodial interrogation2 is fundamen-
tally coercive, the Court held that a de-
tained suspect "must be clearly informed 
that he has the right to consult with a 
lawyer and to have the lawyer with him 
during interrogation . . . " Id. at 1626. 
Failure to offer the assistance of counsel 
during questioning was held to undermine 
the protection of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination. There-
fore, the Court concluded that any evidence 
obtained in a custodial interrogation should 
be excluded where "procedural safeguards 
effective to secure the privilege against 
self-incrimination" were not utilized. Id. at 
1612. 
2. Custodial interrogation was defined as "ques-
tioning initiated by law enforcement officers 
after a person has been taken into custody or 
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in 
any significant way.M Id. at 1612. 
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The Miranda court also attempted to 
define the standard by which invocations of 
the right to counsel should be evaluated. 
The Court held: 
If, however, [a suspect] indicates in any 
manner and at any stage of the process 
that he wishes to consult with an attor-
ney before speaking there can be no 
questioning. 
Id. at 1612. A second requirement was 
also added: the right to counsel could only 
be waived "voluntarily, knowingly, and in-
telligently." Id, The broad language con-
cerning invocation and the strict waiver 
standard, on their face, appear to imply 
that even an ambiguous invocation of the 
right to counsel would require the cessa-
tion of questioning. However, subsequent 
Supreme Court decisions have significantly 
eroded the expansive standards proposed 
by the Miranda court. 
A. 
[1,2] Where a suspect has made an ex-
plicit request for the assistance of counsel, 
the duty imposed upon the police is clear: 
no further questioning may occur until 
counsel is provided or the suspect himself 
initiates further conversation. Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 
L.Ed.2d 378 (1981).3 In Smith v. Illinois, 
469 U.S. 91, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 
(1984), the Court refined this standard by 
setting forth a two step inquiry. First, the 
court must determine whether the defen-
dant actually invoked his right to counsel. 
Once this determination is made, further 
statements by the defendant are admissible 
only if (a) the defendant initiated further 
discussion, and (b) the defendant knowingly 
and intelligently waived the right to have 
an attorney present. Id. 105 S.Ct at 493. 
This Court has applied this analysis in situ-
ations in which the invocation is concededly 
present. See Wainwright v. State, Del. 
Supr., 504 A.2d 1096 (1986); see also 
Brank v. State, Del.Supr., 528 A.2d 1185, 
1187 (1987). 
3. Explicit direction from an attorney to the po-
lice not to question a client without the pres-
ence of counsel is equally effective to bar ques-
In its most recent consideration of the 
issue, the Supreme Court in Arizona v. 
Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 108 S.Ct. 2093,100 
L.Ed.2d 704 (1988), examined an unequivo-
cal invocation of the right to counsel that 
was ignored because the subsequent ques-
tioning involved an unrelated crime. In 
accord with previous decisions, the Rober-
son court held that the bright line rule set 
out in Edwards and Miranda required that 
all interrogation must cease after an un-
equivocal invocation of the right to counsel. 
Moreover, the Court found this strict rule 
to be applicable even if the questioning was 
directed to a crime different from the one 
related to the original invocation. Since 
the State claimed that the second interroga-
tor was unaware of the original request, 
the Roberson court also held that subse-
quent interrogators have the burden of de-
termining whether the right to counsel has 
been invoked. 
B. 
Although it has not specifically ad-
dressed the question of an ambiguous invo-
cation of the right to counsel, the Supreme 
Court has considered related issues on sev-
eral occasions. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 
U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 
(1974) (since the procedural rules of Mi-
randa were not themselves rights protect-
ed by the constitution, strict adherence to 
the form suggested in Miranda was not 
constitutionally required, thus failure of in-
terrogating officers to advise suspect of 
right to appointed counsel did not invali-
date an otherwise voluntary statement); 
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 99 
S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979) (the de-
fendant refused to sign a written waiver 
form, but orally agreed to make a state-
ment. The defendant's actions and words 
were held to be sufficient to indicate that 
he knowingly and voluntarily waived his 
rights); Fare v. Michael C, 442 U.S. 707, 
99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (a per 
se invocation rule is limited to explicit re-
quests for an attorney). 
tioning. Bryan v. State, DeLSupr., 571 A.2d 170 
(1990). 
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|;j, IJ In order for a defendant to rely 
upon Miranda *s bar against further ques-
tioning, it must be shown that a request for 
counsel has been effectively conveyed to 
the interrogating officers. In Alston ?;. 
State, DeLSupr., 554 A.2d 304 (1989), we 
rejected a defendant's pro forma invoca-
tion which was never communicated to per-
sons actually conducting the questioning. 
We there ruled that a prior latent desire to 
communicate with counsel will not override 
clear expressions during a custodial Inter-
rogation of a willingness to respond. 
Here, although the police were aware that 
Crawford was seeking counsel, he had not 
yet contacted an attorney at the time the 
search warrant was executed. The police 
were not required to defer execution of the 
warrant until Crawford succeeded in his 
search for an attorney, since the reading of 
his Miranda rights served to protect Craw-
ford from any forced questioning during 
the execution of the search warrant. At no 
time did Crawford indicate that he would 
deal with the police only through counsel. 
Indeed, his suppression hearing testimony 
makes clear his intention of dealing directly 
with the police in an effort to persuade 
them that he was not involved in the crime 
under investigation. 
Given the ambivalent nature of Craw 
ford's conduct—his searching for an attor 
ney but initiation of discussion with police 
after the initial Miranda warning—we do 
not view his actions as reflecting an un-
equivocal request for the assistance of 
counsel but rather a mixed or ambiguous 
invocation of that right. We thus are re-
quired to determine the manner in which 
the police may respond to a suspect's am-
biguous invocation of his right to counsel. 
Ill 
In Smith v. Illinois, the Supreme Court 
outlined the three approaches to ambigu-
ous requests for an attorney: 
Some courts have held that all question-
ing must cease upon any request for or 
reference to counsel, however equivocal 
or ambiguous.. Others have attempt-
ed to define a threshold standard of clari-
ty for such requests, and have held that 
580 /L2d 571 (1990) 
requests falling below this threshold do 
not trigger the right to counsel Still 
others have adopted a third approach, 
holding that when an accused makes an 
equivocal statement that 'arguably' can 
be construed as a request for counsel, all 
interrogations must immediately cease 
except for narrow questions designed to 
'clarify' the earlier statement of the ac-
cused desires respecting counsel 
105 S.Ct. at 493 n. 3 (citations omitted). 
These standards vary in the degree to 
which the burden of clarity is placed on the 
defendant 
[5] The per se rule requiring complete 
cessation of questioning upon an equivocal 
request for counsel defers to the "in any 
manner" language of Miranda, and places 
the burden of perceptual clarity entirely on 
the police. The leading case adopting this 
approach, Maglio v. Jago, 6th Cir., 580 F.2d 
202 (1978), held that the statement, "maybe 
I should have an attorney" was an equivo-
cal request for counsel. Relying on the 
specific Miranda "in any manner" lan-
guage, the Maglio court found the ambigu-
ous state of the defendant's mind as evi-
denced by his statement was sufficient to 
invoke the right to counsel, and that all 
further interrogation should have ceased. 
[6] The threshold standard looks to the 
totality of circumstances surrounding the 
ambiguous invocation in a search for intent 
with a heavy burden of clarity upon the 
defendant. See e.g. United States v. Gor-
don, 2d Cir., 655 F.2d 478 (1981) (state-
ments made after unsuccessful attempt to 
contact attorney and re-reading of rights 
form were admissible in view of defen-
dant's sophistication and cautious behav-
ior). 
[7] The clarification approach requires 
the interrogating officer to limit his ques-
tions to those designed to elicit definitive 
indications of intent when a suspect makes 
an ambiguous request for counsel. In 
Thompson v. Wainwright, 5th Cir., 601 
F.2d 768 (1979), the court ruled that after 
an equivocal request for counsel, the scope 
of a custodial interrogation should be "im-
mediately narrowed to one subject and one 
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only. Further questioning thereafter 
must be limited to clarifying that request 
until it is clarified." Id. at 771 (emphasis 
in original). The court also determined 
that subsequent questions leading to re-
sponses without the presence of counsel 
failed to clarify the suspect's statement 
that he desired to tell his story to an attor-
ney first. 
In an earlier case, the Fifth Circuit had 
examined an interrogator's discussion of 
the suspect's options regarding the right to 
counsel after the suspect ambiguously indi-
cated he wished to consult an attorney. In 
Nash v. Estelle, 5th Cir., 597 F.2d 513 
(1979), the court-held that the interroga-
tor's subsequent discussion of the suspect's 
right to counsel, which included the option 
of complete cessation of questioning until 
an attorney was provided, was sufficiently 
narrow not to infringe upon, the defen-
dant's Miranda rights. 
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. 
Fouche, 9th Cir., 833 F.2d 1284 (1987) (en 
banc), was required to determine whether a 
second reading to the suspect of his Mi-
randa rights could operate as a clarifica-
tion. Recognizing that "a rote repetition 
of the Miranda rights does not prove that 
a defendant understood and voluntarily 
waived those rights," the Fouche court de-
termined that "Nash does not require a 
mechanical and talismanic repetition of the 
word 'lawyer' when the Miranda warnings 
have been given twice, in great detail, and 
the suspect has understood his rights." Id. 
at 1288-89. Because the agent's questions 
"did not impinge on the exercise of the 
suspect's continuing option to cut off the 
interview," the Fouche court held that the 
interrogation subsequent to the ambiguous 
invocation was designed to clarify, and not 
to elicit incriminating information. Id. at 
1289 (quoting Nash, 597 F.2d at 518). 
Thus, the agent had refrained from further 
interrogation until he had determined that 
Fouche had knowingly and voluntarily 
waived his right to counsel. 
The Eleventh Circuit in United States v. 
Gonzalez, 11th Cir., 833 F.2d 1464 (1987), 
faced an ambiguous request similar to the 
one in this case. The court considered the 
admissability of a confession given after a 
defendant had informed the police that she 
had sought legal counsel but found it too 
expensive to have counsel accompany her 
to interrogation. The agents gave her Mi-
randa warnings after explaining to her the 
booking process, and Gonzalez then gave a 
confession. The Gonzalez court held that 
"[a]ny ambiguity in Gonzalez's statement 
about her inability to retain counsel was 
resolved by her failure to request counsel 
or the presence of counsel after receiving 
the Miranda warning and proceeding with 
her confession." Id. at 1466. 
In comparison, the Eleventh Circuit later, 
in Towne v. Bugger, 11th Cir., 899 F.2d 
1104 (1990), held that the clarification test 
was not satisfied where accusatory state-
ments and repetition of the Miranda rights 
was the interrogator's response to the sus 
pect's question concerning the need for 
counsel. Analogizing to United States v. 
Cherry, 5th Cir., 733 F.2d 1124 (1984) and 
United States v. Fouche, supra, the 
Tovone court observed: 
in both cases, as in the present case, the 
interrogating officer was asked by the 
defendant for advice as to whether the 
defendant should exercise his right to 
get an attorney. Such questions reveal 
to the interrogating officer that the de-
fendant is contemplating exercising his 
right to have an attorney present, and 
under the rule established in Nash and 
Thompson, the officer should clarify the 
defendant's wishes before preceding fur-
ther. 
Id. at 1109. The Towne court held that 
since an equivocal statement was made and 
there was no clarification or initiation, the 
confession was obtained in violation of the 
defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. The 
Gonzalez decision was distinguished on the 
fact that the interrogators in Gonzalez, as 
here, did not make accusatory statements 
in response to the ambiguity, and the right 
to an appointed counsel was made clear by 
the Miranda warning. 
[8] In our view, the clarification ap-
proach adopted by many Federal circuits 
and embraced as well by the highest courts 
CRAWFORD v. STATE 
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of several states4 has much to recommend 
it The per se rule which bars all state-
ments simply because a suspect articulates, 
in the most tentative and general fashion, a 
desire to consult with counsel is too inflexi-
ble and ill serves the needs of reasonable 
police investigation. We view the thresh-
old test as merely establishing the context 
or quantum of evidence which a court will 
examine in the face of a right to counsel 
claim. While Miranda imparts an affirma-
tive duty to advise a suspect of the right to 
counsel incident to a custodial interroga-
tion, the right is subject to waiver simply 
by proceeding to respond. Where a sus-
pect does not unequivocally invoke that 
right, the police should be entitled to at-
tempt to determine the suspect's intention. 
We thus endorse the clarification approach 
which may include, as occurred here, the 
repeating of Miranda warnings as a means 
of emphasizing the defendant's constitu-
tional right to counsel. U.S. Const, amend 
VI; Del. Const, art. I, § 7. If, however, 
the police make additional inquiries con-
cerning a suspect's intentions, the clarify-
ing questions may not coerce or intimidate 
the suspect or otherwise discourage his 
effort to secure counsel, if that is his inten-
tion. Nor may the police tender any legal 
advice or attempt to dissuade the suspect 
from pursuing an intended course. Re-
peated Miranda warnings may prove to be 
of limited clarifying assistance in certain 
situations but they at least serve the pur-
pose of emphasizing the suspect's options 
and placing the responsibility on the sus-
pect to either continue the questioning or 
remain silent until counsel is available. If 
clarifying questions or repeated Miranda 
warnings indicate that the suspect does not 
wish the assistance of counsel, the interro-
gation may continue. 
[9] In this case, Crawford's actions and 
statements to the police conveyed mixed 
signals concerning his willingness to speak 
4. See State v. Lamp, Iowa Supr., 322 N.W.2d 48 
(1982) (holding that phone calls to attorney cou-
pled with reading of rights and waiver did not 
invoke right to counsel since any ambiguity was 
clarified); cf. Daniel v. State, Wyo.Supr., 644 
P.2d 172, 177 (1982) (holding "If it is difficult 
for the police officer to determine whether a 
suspect indeed intends to invoke his right to 
without the presence of counsel. When he 
first broached the subject in his telephone 
call to Officer Vietri, Crawford was advised 
that he, himself, would have to decide 
whether he needed an attorney. From the 
time he was taken into custody he was 
given his Miranda warnings on three sepa-
rate occasions, on the second occasion in 
response to the defendant's initiation of 
discussion while being transported to the 
police station. While the defendant's pre-
custodial conduct suggested that he want-
ed to confer with an attorney, at no time 
while in police custody did he assert a 
desire to consult with counsel before ques-
tioning, even though he was aware that his 
sister was continuing the search for an 
attorney. At best, Crawford's actions re-
flected an interest in securing counsel prior 
to custody but evidencing no unwillingness 
to discuss the matter with the police while 
in custody after thrice being advised of his 
right to remain silent without the presence 
of counsel. Under the circumstances, we 
believe the police acted in good faith in the 
use of the repeated Miranda warnings in 
an effort to clarify Crawford's intentions. 
His statements were thus clearly admissi-
ble in evidence at trial. 
IV 
In refusing to suppress Crawford's state-
ments, the trial court noted that in Craw-
ford's testimony he did not feel that he 
needed counsel present before talking to 
the police. Crawford now questions the 
trial court's use of his suppression hearing 
testimony in the determination that he did 
not desire counsel during interrogation. In 
effect, Crawford argues that any ambi-
guity in his invocation of the right to coun-
sel should be resolved on the facts mani-
fested at the time of the interrogation, 
without consideration of his unarticulated 
have an attorney present, the officer may seek 
clarification of the suspect's desires, as long as 
he does not disguise the clarification as a sub-
terfuge for coercion or intimidation."); see also 
Cannady v. State, Fla.Supr., 427 So.2d 723 
(1983); Russell v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 727 S.W.2d 
573 (1987). 
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intention revealed in the suppression hear-
ing. 
[10] The use of suppression hearing 
testimony to determine a defendant's sub-
jective intention at the time of interroga-
tion is an acceptable practice. In Connect-
icut v. Barret, 479 U.S. 523, 107 S.Ct. 828, 
93 L.Ed.2d 920 (1987), the Supreme Court 
considered contradictory statements con-
cerning the desire to communicate with the 
police without counsel. Although the Bar-
ret court found the defendant's statements 
to be clear and unambiguous, in support of 
that determination, the Court explicitly re-
lied on the defendant's suppression hearing 
testimony as to his subjective under-
standing of the Miranda warnings. See 
id 107.S.Ct: at 832-33. 
In Delap v. Dugger, 11th Cir., 890 F.2d 
285 (1989), the Court confronted the ques-
tion of the use of suppression testimony in 
an equivocal request context. The defen-
dant had indicated to his interrogators that 
he was represented by counsel in an un-
related matter. The court held that this 
alone was not even an ambiguous invoca-
tion of the right to counsel. The defen-
dant's suppression hearing testimony as to 
his intent at the time of interrogation was 
utilized by both the district court and on 
appeal. Delap argued that the use of post-
request statements to clarify his initial 
statement was a violation of Smith v. Illi-
nois, supra. The Delap court held that 
the purpose of the Smith prohibition on the 
use of post-request statements to cast 
doubt on the initial request was to prevent 
deliberate or unintentional overreaching by 
the interrogating officers. Since the use of 
the defendant's testimony for a contextual 
assessment at trial did not implicate the 
concerns of Smith, its admission was 
deemed acceptable. 
We view the trial court's use of Craw-
ford's testimony concerning his intent at 
the time of the questioning as appropriate 
and not inconsistent with the holding in 
Smith v. Illinois. Moreover, there is no 
logical reason to exclude Crawford's testi-
mony, since the objective of the Fifth 
Amendment right to an attorney during 
interrogation would in no way be compro-
mised by the admission of post factum 
statements of intent 
We conclude that the defendant's invoca-
tion of his right to counsel were at best 
equivocal and the police did not violate his 
Fifth Amendment right to counsel in their 
subsequent questioning of him. The trial 
court correctly refused to suppress the dis-
puted statements and the judgment of con-
viction is accordingly, affirmed. 
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County board of assessment deter-
mined that building, which was rented to 
private law firm and which was part of 
complex of buildings owned by historical 
society, was exempt from county taxation. 
County sought judicial review. The Superi-
or Court, New Castle County, upheld the 
board of assessment ruling. County ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Jacobs, Vice 
Chancellor, sitting by designation, held that 
rental of the building did not require deter-
mination that building was "held by way of 
